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Abstract 
This study analyses the semantics of English deontic adjectives like essential and 
appropriate, and uses this to refine traditional definitions of deontic modality, which are 
mainly based on the study of modal verbs. In a first step, it is shown that the set of 
meanings associated with deontic adjectives is quite different from the set of meanings 
identified in the literature on modal verbs. Adjectives lack the directive meanings of 
obligation or permission, which are traditionally regarded as the core deontic categories, 
and they have semantic extensions towards non-modal meanings in the evaluative 
domain. In a second step, the analysis of adjectives is used to propose an alternative 
definition of deontic modality, which covers both the meanings of verbs and adjectives, 
and which can deal with the different extensions towards modal and non-modal 
categories. This is integrated into a conceptual map, which works both in diachrony – 
defining pathways of change – and in synchrony – accommodating refinements within 
each set of meanings.  
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1 Introduction 
 
The literature on modality has typically focused on the category of modal verbs, with the 
Germanic modal auxiliaries as the prototypical cases. This bias is found both in language-
specific accounts (e.g. Palmer, 1979; Coates, 1983; Goossens, 1985; Heine, 1995; 
Hansen, 1998, 2004), and in cross-linguistic studies (e.g. Palmer, 1986, 2001; Bybee et 
al., 1994; Van der Auwera and Plungian, 1998).1 In this study, we will show that the 
analysis of modal adjectives in English, as in the extraposition constructions in (1) and 
(2), significantly changes our understanding of modal semantics, specifically with regard 
to deontic meaning and how it relates to other domains within and beyond modality. 
 
(1)  It was essential, he said, that money was better distributed, so that it reached the 
poorest people. Money was power and without it, Professor Desai said, the 
millions of poor in India would remain without a true say in the running of their 
country. (CB, bbc)2 
(2)  You can indulge the shortcomings of a friend a certain number of times and then, 
unwittingly, they go over the limit. You tot everything up and, like mounting 
endorsements on a driving licence, there comes a point when you decide that in 
total they are unforgivable and can no longer be overlooked. […] Sometimes it 
may be wholly appropriate not to forgive or forget. If your partner begs 
forgiveness and swears he will never do the same again, you may know in your 
heart of hearts that he’s just confessing to get carte blanche to repeat the dirty 
deed. (CB, ukmags) 
 
Traditionally, deontic modality has been defined in terms of the concepts of 
obligation and permission: deontic meanings of verbs like must express an obligation to 
carry out a particular activity, while deontic meanings of verbs like may express 
permission to do it (cf. von Wright, 1951a, b, 1971; Lyons, 1977:823–841; Palmer, 1979: 
ch. 4, 1986:96–115; Van der Auwera and Plungian, 1998:81).3 Verbs with deontic 
meanings are typically also polysemous in the modal domain, with dynamic and 
epistemic meanings in addition to the deontic ones. Diachronically, such epistemic 
                                                 
1
  However, the articles in Hansen and de Haan (2009) form notable exceptions in this respect. 
2
 The Present-day English data are extracted from the COBUILD corpus (marked with CB) and are 
reproduced with the kind permission of HarperCollins Publishers. We also indicate the relevant subcorpus.  
3
 We are, of course, aware of the controversy over whether different interpretations of a modal marker 
represent distinct meanings or uses (polysemy or vagueness) (e.g. Depraetere and Reed, 2006). We believe 
that the theoretical status of the interpretations we discuss in this study is not immediately relevant to the 
argument, so we leave this question aside. We will show, however, that in some cases the wider 
construction can serve to disambiguate (e.g. Section 4, examples (22)–(23)). Of course, the issue remains a 
question for further research. 
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meanings typically develop out of earlier dynamic and/or deontic meanings (cf. 
Goossens, 1999; Traugott and Dasher, 2002: ch. 3; Van Ostaeyen and Nuyts, 2004).  
The study of adjectival constructions as in (1) and (2), however, seriously challenges 
such traditional accounts of deontic modality. First of all, these adjectives cannot encode 
the supposedly central deontic meanings of obligation or permission. Rather than 
imposing an obligation or granting permission, the structures in (1) and (2) merely 
describe the degree of desirability for a State of Affairs (SoA) to take place. Thus, the 
speaker uttering the clause in (1) does not oblige anyone to distribute money in a better 
way, but merely states that he regards it as highly desirable. Similarly, the speaker in (2) 
does not specifically allow anyone not to forgive or forget, but again just uses the 
construction to report on how desirable (s)he thinks this is. Secondly, deontic adjectives 
are different from deontic verbs in that they are often polysemous not just with dynamic 
modal meanings, as in (3) below, but also with meanings beyond the modal domain, as 
shown in (4) below. 
 
(3)  This should make you want to go to the toilet frequently. Although it may sting 
the first few times you go, this usually gets better the more water you pass. It is 
essential to keep emptying the bladder if you are to flush out the germs. (CB, 
ukephem) 
(4)  The system offers callers confidentiality and accepts calls day or night and 
weekends too. […] “As an IT consultancy, it’s appropriate we’re taking the 
initiative and using the latest IT technology,” says Gary. The service employs 
INFOTAP 2000, a Windows-based software which enables audio information 
stored on a personal computer hard disk to be accessed by phone. (CB, today) 
 
In (3), the construction with essential does not express deontic meaning as in (1), but 
rather a necessity that originates in the physical make-up of the human body. The only 
way to flush germs out of your bladder is to keep urinating. Unlike in the case of (1), this 
type of necessity does not involve any attitudinal source, as it does not express someone’s 
personal opinion, but a natural law-like truth. In this study, this type of circumstantial 
necessity is regarded as a subcategory of dynamic modality, specifically SoA-internal or 
‘situational’ dynamic modality (cf. Nuyts, 2005, 2006). The polysemy illustrated by (1) 
and (3) is familiar from the analysis of modal verbs, but another pattern of adjectival 
polysemy is less familiar. The construction with appropriate in (4), for instance, clearly 
does not express situational dynamic meaning, yet its meaning is also quite different from 
that in (2). Whereas in (2) the speaker talks about not forgiving or forgetting as virtual or 
potential SoAs, the SoA assessed in (4) has a different factuality status: it is taking place 
at the moment of speech. This difference in factuality status suggests that constructions 
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with adjectives such as appropriate are polysemous between deontic modality (cf. (2)) 
and what will be called ‘non-modal evaluation’ (cf. (4)).  
Based on our analysis of adjectives, we will propose a redefinition of deontic 
modality that works both for modal verbs and for modal adjectives. In addition, we will 
integrate the different semantic categories expressed by the adjectival constructions and 
their distribution into a conceptual map. This map will be shown to work in diachrony as 
well as in synchrony, as it defines pathways of change and accommodates distinct 
synchronic refinements within each category.  
The structure of this article is as follows. We begin by reviewing the notion of deontic 
modality as proposed in studies of modal auxiliaries in Section 2. In Section 3, we will 
discuss adjectival constructions and the modal-evaluative meanings they express. Since 
these constructions question the traditional definition of deontic modality, we will 
propose an alternative definition. In Section 4, we will relate this definition to the other 
meanings expressed by the constructions studied, using two parameters that together 
make up a conceptual map. In Section 5, we will adduce evidence for the diachronic 
validity and synchronic applicability of the conceptual map. In Section 6, finally, we will 
propose some questions for further reflection.  
 
2 Modal auxiliaries and the deontic domain 
 
As mentioned above, the traditional definition of deontic modality refers to the notions of 
obligation and permission. This characterization goes back to the tradition of modal logic, 
which equals obligation with “deontic necessity”, and permission with “deontic 
possibility” (cf. von Wright, 1951a, b; Lyons, 1977:823; Kratzer, 1978:111; Van der 
Auwera and Plungian, 1998:81).  Such accounts typically use examples such as (5) and 
(6) with the modal auxiliaries must and may.  
 
(5)   You must open the door (Lyons, 1977:832 (3)) 
(6)   You may open the door (Lyons, 1977:832 (5)) 
 
In (5), the speaker imposes an obligation on the hearer by using must, or at least, (s)he 
states that the hearer is “obliged (by some unspecified authority)” to do so (Lyons, 
1977:832). In (6), the speaker grants permission to the hearer to open the door by using 
may, or again, (s)he states that the hearer is allowed (by some unspecified authority) to do 
so.   
Diachronic accounts of the development of modal auxiliaries are based on similar 
definitions of deontic modality. They have shown that the meanings of obligation and 
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permission originate in dynamic meaning (Goossens, 1999, 2000 on must; Traugott and 
Dasher, 2002: ch. 3; Van Ostaeyen and Nuyts, 2004 on Dutch kunnen ‘can, may’). More 
specifically, the first modal meaning developed by auxiliaries such as must and can is the 
participant-inherent subtype of dynamic modality, ascribing abilities or needs to a 
participant as in (7) (cf. Nuyts, 2006:3). In a second stage, this participant-inherent 
meaning is extended to a participant-imposed subtype of dynamic meaning, indicating 
possibilities or necessities imposed by the local circumstances of a participant, as in (8) 
(cf. Nuyts, 2006:3). Deontic meaning, as in (9), then develops out of this participant-
imposed dynamic meaning through subjectification (Traugott, 1989:35): the crucial 
difference from dynamic modality is the presence of an attitudinal source that takes 
responsibility for the deontic assessment. The final modal meaning developed by the 
auxiliaries is epistemic meaning, involving the speaker’s (or someone else’s) estimation 
of the likelihood or truth of a proposition, as in (10) below.  
 
(7)   Wilst ðu,  gif þu  most,  wesan usser her   aldordema, 
    Will  you if  you able.are be.INF our   army leader 
    leodum    lareow? 
    people.DAT  teacher 
‘Are you willing, if you are able, to be the leader of [our] army, [a] teacher [for] 
the people?’ (8th century, Genesis, 2482, as cited in Traugott and Dasher, 
2002:122 (33)) 
(8)   Ic hit þe     þonne gehate  þæt þu  on Heorote most    sorhleas 
    I  it  you[.DAT] then  promise that you in Heorot [able.are] anxiety-free  
swefan. 
sleep 
‘I promise you that you will be able to sleep free from anxiety in Heorot.’ (8th 
century, Beowulf, 1671, as cited in Visser, 1963–73:1791, and Traugott and 
Dasher, 2002:122 (34))  
(9)   we  moton eow   secgan  eowre sawle   þearfe, licige eow   ne  licige
    We must  you.DAT tell[.INF] your  soul.GEN  need  please you.DAT not  please 
    eow 
    you.DAT 
  ‘We must tell you about your soul’s need, whether it pleases you or not.’ (c1000  
ÆCHom I, 17 (App) 182.240, as cited in Goossens, 1987:32) 
(10)  He that dooth good & doth not goodly … must nedes      be   bade 
    He that does  good & does not rightly  … must  without.doubt  be.INF bad 
 ‘Whoever does good, but does not do it with good intentions … must necessarily 
be bad.’ (1385, Usk, Testament of Love (Skeat) 109, 90, as cited in Visser, 1963–
73:1810, and Traugott, 1989:42 (25)) 
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More recent accounts of modal auxiliaries have proposed a distinction between 
obligation and permission on the one hand, and desirability on the other hand. Thus, for 
instance, Nuyts et al. (2005) argue that the meaning of examples like (11) and (12) below 
is quite different from the traditional notions of obligation and permission.  
 
(11)  A: And you are going to bring your poems or what? 
 B: Yes, because I have such a hard time deciding what I am going to take. I have 
to pick out three, and they should relate to each other to some extent, in my 
opinion, and it can’t be too sinister I think. (cited in Nuyts et al. 2005: 29 (24))4 
(12)  There is no pre-contract available in Scotland. I have written to both the SFA and 
the Scottish League pointing this out. Morton will not be disadvantaged by any 
other football club. We also deplore that a person not involved in the affairs of 
this club gave advice to the player. (CB, sunnow) 
 
These structures indicate the degree of (moral) desirability of an SoA. They relate to 
the traditional notions of obligation and permission as would sincerity conditions to an 
illocutionary act (compare Searle, 1969, 1976): “a deontic assessment may serve as the 
‘sincerity condition’ of a directive, i.e. as the ‘mental state’ underlying the obligation or 
permission” (Nuyts et al., 2010:18) In this perspective, the fundamental difference 
between the two is that the meanings expressed in (11) and (12) are attitudinal, with a 
primary function in the domain of qualifications of SoAs, while the traditional notions of 
obligation and permission are illocutionary, with a primary function in the interactional 
system of language. While such distinctions may at first sight seem more relevant to 
philosophical debates rather than linguistic ones, our analysis of adjectives will show that 
there are actually good linguistic reasons to keep the two types of meaning apart, and to 
shift the core of deontic meaning from obligation/permission to desirability. 
 
 
3 Adjective classes and the deontic domain5 
 
Against the traditional approach, the adjectival data show that it is useful to distinguish 
between deontic meaning, which serves to qualify SoAs, and directive meaning, which is 
                                                 
4
 In fact, this example is the authors’ translation of the Dutch original in (i) below, taken from the Corpus 
Gesproken Nederlands (‘Corpus of Spoken Dutch’). 
(i) A: en gij gaat dan uw gedichten meebrengen of wat? 
B: ja want ik kan zo moeilijk beslissen wat dat ‘k ga nemen. ik moet er drie uitnemen en ze moeten 
een beetje verband hebben met elkaar vind ik en ’t mag niet te zwartgallig zijn vind ik. (42 – 
fv700058) 
5
 This section is based on Van linden (2009:34–46, forthc.). 
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illocutionary in nature, as also proposed in Nuyts et al. (2005, 2010). Consider the 
following examples.6  
(13)  Country sports make a hugh [sic] voluntary contribution to conservation of the 
countryside Angling clubs fight pollution and water abstraction; shooting and 
hunting enthusiasts maintain woodlands and hedgerows. It is essential that we 
protect wildlife habitats; but we have to face up to the fact that 80 [%, AVL & 
JCV] of the countryside is in private ownership. (CB, ukephem) 
(14) We consider that our security must be guaranteed by consolidating the 
nationalities within our own nation-state and also through bilateral treaties with 
all the other Balkan countries.  It’s also important to set up a European security 
system. (CB, bbc) 
(15)  It is obligatory to drive with dipped headlights on, even during the daytime, even 
on the brightest summer day. This rule applies to all vehicles, including 
motorcycles and mopeds. (CB, ukephem) 
In example (13), the speaker regards it as highly desirable that we protect wild life 
habitats. In example (14), the speaker regards it as important to set up a European 
security system. Both examples involve an attitudinal judgement of desirability on the 
part of the speaker, but they do not encode the illocutionary meaning of obligation. By 
contrast, example (15) with obligatory does encode (descriptive) directive meaning: the 
speaker reports on the existence of the obligation to drive with dipped headlights on, but 
does not necessarily assess this as desirable. Such examples support the need to 
distinguish conceptual deontic meaning from illocutionary directive meaning as proposed 
by Nuyts et al. (2005, 2010), since the two types of meaning correlate with different sets 
of adjectives. Still, our adjectival data also suggest that deontic and directive meaning are 
not unrelated. One reason is that the hearer may infer a directive meaning from a deontic 
expression as a preferred interpretation (Levinson, 2000), but this remains a cancellable 
implicature: the speaker of (14) may say “I just said it is important to set up a European 
security system, I did not order you to take steps yet”. Another reason is that speakers 
may intend to perform a directive speech act but choose to use a deontic expression in 
order to minimize the ‘face work’ (Brown and Levinson, 1987). Deontic expressions can 
thus be used as a polite alternative for a directive (cf. Nuyts et al., 2005:48).  
Even though our data on adjectives back up the distinction between deontic and 
directive meaning as proposed in the work of Nuyts, they also show that his new 
definition of deontic modality is not unproblematic. More precisely, the deontic category 
                                                 
6
 Our analysis is based on a qualitative study of 22 adjectives in Present-day English examples extracted 
from the British subcorpora of the COBUILD Corpus, including data from a wide variety of genres and 
registers (for more information, see http://www.collins.co.uk/cobuild/) (Van linden, 2009: ch. 2). The 22 
adjectives are listed in Figure 1 below, viz. the weak, strong, and directive adjectives. 
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is defined so broadly that it does not take into account the factuality status of the SoA 
under assessment. Expressions of permission and obligation (deontic in the traditional 
definition) invariably involve potential SoAs, which are by default realized in the future 
(cf. Bolinger, 1967:356–359; Palmer, 2001:8; Verstraete, 2007:42–46). Nuyts (2005:23), 
however, argues that deontic expressions involve the estimation of “the degree of moral 
commitment of the speaker to a real or possible state of affairs” (italics added), and thus 
assumes that deontic modality applies to both factual and potential SoAs. In his view, the 
following examples all express deontic meaning.  
(16)  OBVIOUSLY, when choosing a guitar, it’s important to consider the style of 
music you’ll be playing. Nick: “Yeah, the Starfield is on a par with the Hohner, 
but in a different style. If you’re playing rock it’s always good to go for 
something with humbucking pickups.” (CB, ukmags)      
(17)  The show at The Works had a lot of coverage from the mainstream press, which 
included the Independent, I-D magazine and even the Sun, who took great delight 
in including an inset of the Bona Lisa. I felt it was very important that they chose 
to feature Lesbian Arts Network, as it meant that the mainstream was readily 
accessible. Such results are the driving force behind Sadie’s work. (CB, ukmags) 
(18)  It is going to be fascinating next season with the two big guns, Arsenal and 
United, head-to-head at the top of the Premiership and in the European Cup. It can 
only be good for English football that so much quality will be on view in the 
Champions League, which rival managers Arsene Wenger and Alex Ferguson 
will be desperate to win. (CB, sunnow) 
In example (16), the SoA that is assessed as important is potential at the time of speaking. 
The expression serves as a general guideline in choosing guitars, and the SoA referred to 
in the to-clause has not been carried out yet (nor does the context give indications as to 
whether it will be carried out or not). In example (17), by contrast, the context suggests 
that the SoA assessed as important (viz. the decision to feature Lesbian Arts Network) 
has already been actualized at the moment of deontic assessment (I felt). In example (18), 
the SoA that is assessed as good (viz. the participation of Arsenal and Manchester United 
in the Champions League) has not been actualized at the moment of deontic assessment 
(viz. the moment of speech), but at that same time, it is certain that these two clubs will 
compete in the Champions League. Thus, we can conclude that deontic expressions as 
defined by Nuyts (2005) can be divided into two types on the basis of the factuality status 
of the SoAs being assessed. The SoA can be either potential (as in (16)), or presupposed 
to be true (already actualized in (17), or bound to be actualized in (18)) – compare 
McGregor’s (1997:221–222) distinction between desiderative and evaluative attitudinal 
modification. 
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This difference in factuality status in the construction also implies a difference in the 
semantics of the clausal complement and the adjectival matrix. In fact, only potential 
SoAs, as in (16), can be regarded as desirable in the true sense of the word, as these SoAs 
have not yet been actualized. Deontic constructions with a potential SoA in their 
complement have a volitional flavour: the assessor wants the SoA to be actualized (cf. 
Kiefer, 1997:242; McGregor, 1997:222). Therefore, complements containing a potential 
SoA will be termed ‘mandative’ complements (cf. Wierzbicka, 1988:133–134 on verbal 
complementation; Huddleston and Pullum, 2002:996). By contrast, complement 
constructions with presupposed SoAs lack this volitional flavour. In fact, it makes little 
sense to desire the actualization of an SoA that has already been actualized (temporal 
relation of anteriority, as in (17)), is being actualized (temporal relation of simultaneity, 
as in (4)), or is bound to be actualized (temporal relation of posteriority, as in (18)). 
Therefore, speakers cannot assess such SoAs as desirable, but they can only evaluate 
them as, for instance, appropriate (as in (4)), important (as in (17)), or good (as in (18)). It 
should be noted that with presupposed complements, important typically means 
‘significant’, as in (17) (cf. Lemke, 1998:36–37). All of this shows that the factuality 
status of the SoA under assessment also forces a different meaning onto the adjectival 
matrix, in this case an evaluative meaning. Since the complements containing a 
presupposed SoA are propositions to which the evaluation encoded by the adjective 
applies, these will be termed ‘propositional’ complements (cf. Van linden and Davidse, 
2009). In Section 4, we will give further semantic and syntactic arguments for the 
distinction between mandative and propositional complements.   
More generally, we argue, against Nuyts et al. (2005, 2010), that the difference in 
factuality status of the SoA, and its influence on the interpretation of the adjective, calls 
for a distinction between two types of meaning. In fact, we propose a delineation of 
deontic modality that covers expressions with a potential SoA like (16), but excludes 
expressions with a presupposed SoA like (17) and (18). More specifically, in our view, 
deontic modality involves the assessment of the degree of desirability of a virtual SoA, 
whose realization is by default in the future, by some attitudinal source. This means that, 
when compared to Nuyts’s (2005:23) definition, deontic modality is reduced to its 
traditional definition to some extent, in that – like the concepts of obligation and 
permission/directives – it is restricted to virtual SoAs. The crucial point, however, is that 
we stick to the distinction between deontic and directive meaning: deontic expressions 
never encode the directive notions of obligation or permission. In addition, we propose to 
relegate the expressions with a presupposed SoA to the realm of evaluative meaning, on a 
par with other expressions in which the (speaker’s) attitudinal assessment also applies to 
a proposition. Examples of such expressions are given below.  
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(19)  He is still recognized today, even without the sideburns. “I’m afraid I’ll probably 
be famous for that,” he says. “But it’s surprising that after 20 years people 
recognise me. Sometimes they say very choice words.” (CB, times) 
(20)  It is ironic that India reveres thousands of goddesses and mothers as a 
reincarnation of a goddess on earth and yet we allow the dowry system which has 
become an extortion racket and the ‘duty’ to have a son. (CB, ukmags) 
 
These examples involve attitudinal or evaluative judgements and contain propositional 
complements with presupposed SoAs. Therefore, these expressions will be taken to 
express ‘non-modal’ evaluative meaning (cf. Perkins, 1983:12; Kiefer, 1987:88; Narrog, 
2005:185–187; see also Section 4).  
As mentioned above, adjectival constructions can also express situational dynamic 
meaning (cf. (3)) in addition to deontic and non-modal evaluative meaning. There is, in 
fact, interesting evidence for the distinction between deontic meaning and the 
conceptually related categories of dynamic and non-modal evaluative meaning in the 
lexical distribution of adjectives across these three types of meaning. Adjectives such as 
essential, for instance, which express a strong degree of desirability in the deontic 
domain (cf. (1)), are also found in situational dynamic expressions (cf. (3)), but they do 
not occur in non-modal evaluative expressions. Adjectives such as appropriate and 
important, by contrast, which express a weak degree of desirability in the deontic domain 
(cf. (2), (16)), are also attested in non-modal evaluative expressions (cf. (4), (17)), but 
they are not found in situational dynamic expressions. The adjectives can thus be divided 
into two semantically coherent lexical classes, viz. weak and strong adjectives, which 
manifest different patterns of polysemy in the deontic domain and related conceptual 
domains. Whereas the strong adjectives are semantically most similar to the modal 
auxiliaries, the weak adjectives have a potentiality which modal auxiliaries lack, viz. they 
can be used to express non-modal evaluative meaning. They thus present us with a new 
type of polysemy in the modal-evaluative domain.  
 
 
4 An alternative map of deontic modality and related meanings7 
 
The preceding section has discussed the semantic distinctions at work in constructions 
with adjectives like appropriate, good, important and essential. In this section, we will 
integrate these findings in a conceptual map that covers not only adjectives, but also 
verbs, modal auxiliaries and imperative mood. A discussion of the division of labour 
between these categories is postponed until Section 6. We will first present our 
                                                 
7
 This section is based on Van linden (2009:46–54, forthc.). 
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conceptual map, given in Figure 1 below, and focus on how it integrates the distinctions 
observed in the preceding sections. 
 
<Please insert Figure 1 about here> 
 
There are two basic distinctions along which the map is organized. The first 
distinction is between conceptual and illocutionary meaning, or more generally, between 
the qualificational and the interactional system of language. As pointed out in Section 2, 
deontic modality has traditionally been defined in terms of permission and obligation, 
which are in fact illocutionary notions. Against this traditional approach, Nuyts et al. 
(2005, 2010) have proposed distinguishing between deontic meaning, which is 
conceptual in nature, and directive meaning, which is illocutionary in nature, as adopted 
here in the conceptual map. This distinction is represented on the horizontal axis of the 
map.  
Apart from the semantic motivations presented in Section 2, the study of adjectives in 
Section 3 also adduced lexical arguments in support of the distinction between conceptual 
and illocutionary meaning, in the sense that specific sets of adjectives specialize in either 
of the two types of meanings. In the map, lexical boundaries are represented in dashed 
lines. Adjectives such as advisable, obligatory, compulsory and mandatory (in grey font) 
are all located in the illocutionary domain on the right. They can only express descriptive 
directive meaning, i.e. they report on a recommendation or an obligation (cf. (15)) but do 
not necessarily involve the speaker’s commitment to desirability. The other adjectives (in 
black font) are all situated in the conceptual domain.8 In addition, the arrow going from 
the conceptual to the illocutionary domain indicates that deontic adjectives – unlike their 
directive counterparts – can pragmatically shift domains. The arrow represents the 
plausibility of conversational implicatures from deontic meaning to directive meaning (as 
discussed in Section 3 above). Deontic constructions with weak adjectives such as (14) 
can be intended or interpreted as a piece of advice, whereas deontic constructions with 
strong adjectives such as (13) can be intended or interpreted as an obligation.  
Interestingly, there is evidence from grammaticalization studies that in other 
languages the same arrow also specifies the direction of grammaticalization processes. Of 
the seventy-six languages sampled by Bybee et al. (1994:31), thirty-four show evidence 
of a lexical source for a form expressing obligation. Three of these developed from 
adjectives. Both for Mwera (Niger-Congo) and Lahu (Sino-Tibetan), the source is ‘be 
fitting, be proper’ (1994:183). In Palaung (Mon-Khmer), the particle for obligation means 
‘good’, “perhaps giving the implication ‘it is good, fitting to’” (1994:183). In some 
                                                 
8
 It can be noted that on the horizontal axis both the deontic and directive adjectives are separated from the 
modal auxiliaries, as these can be used to encode conceptual or illocutionary meaning, whereas the 
adjectives are restricted to one of these two types.  
 13
Slavonic languages, impersonal adjectival matrices have also grammaticalized into 
markers of obligation (Hansen, 2004:250, 253). The driving factor of these 
grammaticalization processes is probably the semanticization or conventionalization of 
conversational implicatures, which is also seen at work in related semantic changes (e.g., 
Traugott and Dasher (2002) on the development of English modal auxiliaries must and 
ought to). It should be noted, finally, that in the cross-linguistic data, it is constructions 
with weak adjectival matrices that develop into markers of obligation. In this sense, it is 
interesting to note that the weakest or most polite deontic expression has acquired the 
strongest directive meaning. The question why this is the case is beyond the scope of this 
study. What is important here is that there are indications that the horizontal arrow in the 
map has diachronic as well as cross-linguistic validity.  
The second basic distinction in the map is between dynamic, deontic and non-modal 
evaluative meaning, all within the domain of conceptual meaning. This distinction is 
based on two parameters, represented on the vertical axis on the left in the map. 
Specifically, the three types of meaning can be distinguished on the basis of the presence 
or absence of an attitudinal source, and on the basis of the factuality status of the SoA 
(see Sections 1 and 3). Both parameters have been proposed in previous work, but it is 
their combination that we believe offers a new perspective in the literature on modality.   
First, the parameter of the presence or absence of an attitudinal source sets apart 
dynamic modality from both deontic modality and non-modal evaluation. This is a well-
known parameter in analyses of modal meaning, see for instance Halliday (1970), 
Verstraete (2001), and Nuyts (2005). As discussed in Section 1 (cf. (3)), dynamic 
expressions do not involve attitudinal judgements: abilities/possibilities or 
needs/necessities inherent in the participant or in the situation are internal to the SoA. 
Unlike dynamic expressions, deontic ((cf. (13), (14)), epistemic (cf. (10)) and non-modal 
evaluative expressions (cf. (17), (18)) involve attitudinal sources, which make an 
assessment of the desirability of virtual SoAs, or the likelihood or 
significance/appropriateness of propositional contents (see Sections 2 and 3).  
Second, the parameter of factuality status sets apart non-modal evaluation from 
dynamic and deontic modality. This parameter implies a definition of modality in terms 
of the factuality of the SoA, as proposed in, for example, Narrog (2005). More 
specifically, dynamic and deontic expressions do not take the factuality status of the SoA 
for granted. Rather, they are indeterminate with regard to their factuality status. Non-
modal evaluative expressions, by contrast, invariably involve presupposed SoAs: the 
attitudinal source expresses his/her commitment to a propositional content that is 
presupposed to be true (see Section 3).  
Like the distinction on the horizontal axis, the distinctions on the vertical axis are 
corroborated by arguments from lexical distribution. As can be seen in the map, the two 
parameters discussed above correlate with patterns of polysemy of weak and strong 
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adjectives (see Section 3). Weak adjectives can be found in deontic expressions and in 
non-modal evaluative expressions, as illustrated by appropriate in (2) and (4) 
respectively, but not in dynamic ones. With respect to the parameters, this implies that 
there is a subset of adjectives that is specialized in attitudinal meaning. For this subset, 
the parameter of factuality status provides a further distinction, viz. between deontic 
meaning, involving potential SoAs, and non-modal evaluative meaning, involving 
presupposed SoAs. Strong adjectives, by contrast, are polysemous between deontic and 
dynamic meaning, as illustrated by essential in examples (1) and (3) respectively, but 
they do not occur in non-modal evaluative expressions. With respect to the parameters, 
this implies that there is also a subset of adjectives that is restricted to modal expressions 
with potential SoAs. Here, the parameter of the attitudinal source makes a further 
distinction between dynamic and deontic meaning. However, this distinction is merely 
conceptual: the first indicates needs or necessities on the basis of SoA-internal grounds, 
whereas the second is based on SoA-external (e.g. moral) grounds. Unlike in the case of 
deontic and non-modal evaluative expressions (see further below), there are no formal 
differences between the complements of dynamic expressions and those of deontic ones. 
Figure 2 visualizes the interaction of the parameters with the two sets of adjectives in 
relation to the conceptual categories they express. It shows that the parameter of the 
attitudinal source correlates with the patterns of polysemy of weak adjectives, whereas 
the parameter of factuality correlates with those of strong adjectives. 
 
<Please insert Figure 2 about here> 
 
Further arguments for the distinction between modal and non-modal evaluation can 
be found in the semantic and syntactic properties of mandative versus propositional 
complements. In Present-day English, for example, only mandative complements allow 
the subjunctive mood, as in (21) below. Both semantic types of complement can have 
should as finite form, but this form has a different meaning in each type. Huddleston and 
Pullum (2002:995), for instance, distinguish between “mandative” and “attitudinal” 
should. They further note that only the first type, illustrated in (22), can be replaced by a 
subjunctive form (2002:1001). The second type, illustrated in (23), by contrast, can only 
be replaced by an indicative form (or an epistemically used modal auxiliary).  
 
(21)  When those in the higher ranks give a verbal order it is crucial that it be 
understood by everyone. On the few occasions I have seen and heard Marcus Fox 
on television, I have had difficulty understanding him, but that hardly matters. 
(CB, times) 
(22)  Responding to Sanco’s position, a statement issued by government spokesperson 
Dave Steward in Cape Town said free and fair elections will be impossible unless 
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all political parties are allowed to campaign freely in all parts of the country and 
among all communities. In this process (of democracy) it is essential that the 
playing fields should be even for all parties in all circumstances the government 
statement said. (CB, ukmags) 
(23)  Sir, It was poignant and entirely fitting that the nation should fall silent for one 
minute on Sunday to demonstrate its sympathy for Dunblane’s awful loss (report, 
18/03/1996); and how striking it was that supermarkets, stations and sports 
stadiums suspended their business at the time. (March 13, a massacre took place 
in Dunblane, Scotland) (CB, times)  
 
We can thus conclude that apart from the lexical arguments given above, there are also 
semantic and syntactic arguments in support of the distinction between modal and non-
modal evaluation.  
 
 
5 Further evidence for the conceptual map 
 
In this section, we will present further arguments in favour of the conceptual map and the 
distinctions proposed so far. In particular, we will show its diachronic validity and 
synchronic applicability. In Section 5.1, we will discuss the diachronic relations between 
the categories in the map, and in Section 5.2 we will discuss synchronic refinements of 
these categories, which provide evidence for their different internal organizations.    
 
 
5.1 Diachronic validity 
 
In Section 4 we briefly discussed evidence from grammaticalization for the diachronic 
relation between deontic and directive meaning on the horizontal axis of the map. In this 
section, we present arguments for defining the vertical axis (from dynamic over deontic 
to non-modal evaluative) as a diachronic pathway of change, focusing on the 
development of the adjectives as well as that of their complement patterns.  
A first line of argument relates to the diachronic development of the adjectives. 
Historical corpus data confirm that dynamic and deontic modality are diachronically 
ordered in the domain of adjectives, as discussed in more detail in Van linden et al. 
(2008) and Van linden (2009: ch. 3, 2010). Strong adjectives of non-Germanic origin, 
like essential and crucial, for instance, first develop situational dynamic meaning from 
their original non-modal meaning, and thus enter the conceptual map from below. In a 
later stage, they develop deontic meaning through the process of subjectification 
(Traugott, 1989:35). This dynamic-deontic pathway is similar to the one proposed for 
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modal auxiliaries such as can or must (cf. Goossens, 1999; Traugott and Dasher, 2002: 
ch. 3). However, whereas the modal auxiliaries first undergo micro-changes within the 
dynamic domain from participant-inherent to participant-imposed meaning before they 
develop deontic meaning (see Section 2), the adjectives develop only one type of 
dynamic meaning which leads to deontic meaning, viz. situational meaning. Even more 
interestingly, the analysis of the pre-modal stages of the adjectives offers new insights 
into how the lexical items develop modal meaning in the first place. This development 
turns out to crucially depend on the development of two semantic properties, viz. 
relationality and potentiality, which can be regarded as the conditions of entry into the 
conceptual map. Relationality is needed to turn the adjective into a predicate of necessity 
that can link two concepts. In heat is an essential property of fire, for instance, essential 
links a part (heat) with a whole (fire), establishing a relation of intrinsic inclusion. 
Potentiality, developed later than relationality in the case of essential and vital, and at the 
same time in the case of crucial and critical, is needed to ensure that the relationship 
established by the adjective is one of indispensability, rather than intrinsic inclusion, 
which gives rise to dynamic meaning, as in practice is essential to perfection. Due to 
restrictions of space, it is impossible to elaborate on these developments more 
extensively, but further details can be found in Van linden et al. (2008) and Van linden 
(2010).  
A second piece of evidence pertains to the diachronic development of the 
complement patterns, and points to a developmental relation between deontic and non-
modal evaluative meaning. As shown in Van linden and Davidse (2009), adjectives that 
manifest a time lag between their occurrence in deontic and non-modal evaluative 
constructions invariably pattern with mandative complements first, before they can take 
propositional complements. Two pathways can be distinguished. One pathway has a 
combined mandative-propositional pattern as the transitional stage, as in (24), from 
which the mandative to-clause – typically including a cognition verb, such as note, 
remember or observe in (24) – has been dropped but remains in some sense implied (A > 
A+B > B). This development accounts for the specific semantic-pragmatic value of their 
single proposition pattern: the attitudinal source does not assess the propositional content 
in the complement as important, but rather encourages the hearer to focus mentally on 
that propositional content. In (25), for instance, the speaker urges his interlocutor to focus 
mentally on his motivation in designing clothes: he wants to reach as many people as 
possible, not just the upper-class. 
 
(24) This statement I have endeavoured to verify, and I believe it to be substantially 
correct; if it was a resolution, it was dictated, not discussed. It is also important to 
observe, that no similar resolution stands on the council-books for any previous 
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year. (CLMETEV 1830 Babbage, Reflections on the decline of science in 
England)9 
(25)  I’m not into just designing for those people with money. I mean I think it’s really 
important that I want to reach as broad a field as possible <M01> Mm <F04> I 
mean I’m going to open a shop erm next month <M01> What a wedding shop 
<F04> just dedicated to weddings as well. (CB, ukspok) 
 
The other pathway involves bridging contexts as the transitional stage, which 
contextually support both a mandative and propositional reading (A > A/B > B) (cf. 
Evans and Wilkins, 2000:550). In (26), for example, the context allows both a mandative 
and attitudinal interpretation of should in the complement. In the propositional pattern, 
illustrated in (27), the attitudinal source evaluates the propositional content as 
appropriate; construction B thus expresses true non-modal evaluative meaning.10  
 
(26) A Lawyer is an honest Employment, so is mine. Like me too he acts in a double 
Capacity, both against Rogues and for ‘em; for ‘t is but fitting that we should 
protect and encourage Cheats, since we live by them. (CLMETEV 1728 Gay, The 
beggar's opera) 
(27) Gradually her brain, recovering from its obsession, began to grasp the phenomena 
of her surroundings, and she saw that she was on a yacht, and that the yacht was 
moving. […] Nella all through her life had had many experiences of yachting. […] 
She loved the water, and now it seemed deliciously right and proper that she 
should be on the water again. (CLMETEV 1902 Bennett, The grand Babylon 
Hotel) 
 
Together with the evidence of the semantic development of the adjectives, this second 
argument on the development of the complement patterns shows that the vertical axis of 
the conceptual map also accommodates pathways of diachronic change.  
 
 
5.2 Synchronic applicability 
 
                                                 
9
 Examples (24), (26) and (27) are taken from the extended version of the Corpus of Late Modern English 
texts (De Smet, 2005, 2008).  
10
 The meaning of weak adjectives such as fitting and proper in constructions with propositional 
complements often boils down to a general positive evaluation, evoking qualities such as ‘good’, ‘natural’, 
‘logical’, ‘significant’, etc (cf. Van linden and Davidse, 2009:180). In this sense, these meanings are very 
similar to the lexical pre-modal meanings of the adjectives. As suggested by a referee, it can thus be 
hypothesized that these post-modal meanings in non-modal evaluative constructions are continuations of 
the pre-modal meanings in predications of entities, rather than of the modal meanings in deontic 
constructions (predications of potential SoAs).   
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The evidence for the synchronic validity of the conceptual map lies in its potential for 
semantic refinement. Detailed analysis of Present-day English corpus examples shows 
that the categories of the map can still be subdivided. Crucially, each category on the 
vertical axis has a different internal organization, whereas the two adjacent categories on 
the horizontal axis have a similar one (Van linden, 2009: ch. 6, forthc.).  
If we take a closer look at the set of constructions expressing deontic modality, the 
category that is central in this article, we can actually distinguish between two subtypes 
of deontic meaning. More precisely, expressions of desirability can function on two 
distinct levels, either relating to events in the real world (SoA-related), or relating to the 
speaker’s argumentative goals (speaker-related), as has been observed for other linguistic 
phenomena, like interclausal relations (e.g., Davies, 1979:146–176; Sweetser, 1990:76–
112; Verstraete, 2007: ch. 9). SoA-related uses express the desirability for someone to 
carry out a particular SoA in the real world, as in (28). Speaker-related uses, by contrast, 
are not so much oriented towards the extralinguistic world, but are used to structure a 
stretch of discourse, as in (29) below, to build an argument, or to focus the hearer’s 
attention onto a certain proposition. 
 
(28)  TONY Blair’s Drug Czar Keith Hellawell admitted last night it would be ‘pie in 
the sky’ for him to pledge the creation of a totally drug-free Britain. But he 
insisted it was vital to warn kids of the perils they face. He said: “Children as 
young as five need to understand the consequences that drugs have. It’s crucial 
we get to them before the drug dealers do.” (CB, sunnow) 
(29)  Therefore missionary translations appealed to the very roots of these societies, 
touching the springs of life and imagination in real, enduring ways. Perhaps it was 
to this phenomenon that Pliny the Younger referred in his letter to the Emperor 
Trajan, namely, that Christian renewal also transforms while stimulating older 
habits and attitudes. Whatever the case, it would be appropriate to conclude this 
section of our discussion with a closer clarification of the vernacular issue in 
Christian missionary translation, and do this in two interconnected stages. (CB, 
ukbooks) 
 
In (28) the SoAs that are assessed as desirable clearly relate to the real world: warning 
children about the dangers of drugs before they are exposed to drug dealers is something 
that can only be carried out in the extra-linguistic world. In (29), however, the SoA 
assessed as desirable relates to text structure and the deontic expression as a whole serves 
the speaker’s argumentative goals. Specifically, it is used to indicate that the speaker has 
finished the body of the text and now proceeds to the conclusion. The speaker also 
indicates what this conclusion will look like, viz. a clarification of the vernacular issue in 
Christian missionary translation. 
 19
Interestingly, the same distinction between SoA-related and speaker-related uses can 
be found in the directive domain. Consider the following examples with obligatory.  
 
(30) Use of safety belts is obligatory in back seats, if fitted, as well as in front seats. It 
is also obligatory to use child safety equipment where fitted. Failure to do so 
may result in a fine of max. NOK 500. (CB, ukephem) 
(31) In reconciliation with past tracer permeability experiments and current 
understanding of pathogenesis of proteinuria from knockout and knockin mice, it 
seems obligatory to conclude that the integrated functions of all strata of the 
glomerular capillary wall are essential to maintain its permeability characteristics. 
With the disruption of any component, either of slit diaphragm or GBM, one 
would anticipate a compromise in the barrier functions of the capillary wall. 
(http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1941605, accessed 
on 28 dec 2008) 
 
In (30), the obligation to use child safety equipment where fitted clearly relates to 
extralinguistic reality. The example thus expresses SoA-related directive meaning. The 
directive expression in (31), however, is used to serve the speakers’ argumentative goals 
in building a text. It is found in the final section of a paper on renal glomerular 
capillaries, and it is used by the writers to indicate that the description of the research in 
the main body of the text has come to an end. At the same time, the expression points to 
the conclusion that follows from what has been described in the preceding discourse, and, 
like in (29), it justifies the contents of the following discourse. The examples therefore 
illustrate that like adjectives such as crucial and appropriate, directive adjectives can also 
function on two distinct levels, viz. an SoA-related level and a speaker-related level. 
Hence they show that the two categories on the vertical axis of the conceptual map share 
the same internal organization.11  
By contrast, the two remaining categories on the vertical axis of the map do not 
distinguish between SoA-related and speaker-related uses. The category of dynamic 
modality, first, is not compatible with speaker-related usage, as dynamic expressions do 
not involve an attitudinal source whose argumentative purposes could be served. Rather, 
they always relate to the outside world, expressing necessities that originate in 
circumstances such as the nature of things (e.g. the landscape in (32)), or in self-imposed 
systems (e.g. the parliamentary system of Great Britain in (33)).  
 
                                                 
11
 It should be noted that deontic and directive meaning only share the same internal organization on the 
first level of refinement. More detailed analysis actually uncovers differences between the two categories, 
as described in Van linden (2009: ch. 6, forthc.). 
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(32) I say “up there” meaning the high lake above Llyn Lliwiog, a remote barren tarn 
that was my best retreat. To reach this high lake it was necessary to climb to the 
Diffwys, to go the length of that dark valley and to climb again the height of the 
rim at its far end: from there it was a gentle walk down to the lake. (CB, ukbooks) 
(33)  Now we have the chance to protect wild animals from this kind of sickening 
cruelty. On 14th February, Parliament will debate the Wild Mammals (Protection) 
Bill. We must persuade our mps to support the Bill – it’s a Private Member’s Bill, 
and so it is essential that at least 100 mps support it, or it will get thrown out 
without a second reading. (CB, ukephem) 
 
Non-modal evaluative meaning does always involve an attitudinal source, but the 
distinction between SoA-related and speaker-related uses does not seem to be relevant 
here either. For instance, if we turn example (29) into a non-modal evaluative 
construction as in (34), we do not get an expression that can be used to serve the 
speaker’s purposes in text-building.  
 
(34)  Whatever the case, it [is] appropriate to [have concluded] this section of [the] 
discussion with a closer clarification of the vernacular issue in Christian 
missionary translation, and [have done] this in two interconnected stages.  
 
This example can only be interpreted as an evaluation of an established fact; it cannot be 
used to structure a text. The fact can be understood as an action of the speaker at a time 
anterior to the time of speaking, or as an action accomplished by someone else at a time 
anterior to the time of speaking. In any case, the expression as a whole has lost its 
potential to indicate and motivate the organization of a text, which shows that non-modal 
evaluative meaning has a different organization from deontic meaning.  
In summary, the synchronic evidence for the conceptual map rests on the finding that 
the categories on its vertical axis have a different internal organization, reflecting their 
different conceptual make-up, whereas the categories that are adjacent on its horizontal 
axis feature a similar internal structure, which may explain why they have typically been 
conflated in the literature (see Sections 2 and 3). In particular, we showed that the 
distinction between SoA-related and speaker-related uses is relevant to the deontic and 
directive domain, but not to the dynamic and non-modal evaluative domains. Present-day 
English corpus examples show that these last domains can be refined as well, but a 
detailed account of these refinements is beyond the scope of this article (see Van linden, 
2009: ch. 6 for further details). We can conclude here by presenting the conceptual map 
again, integrating the evidence for its diachronic validity and synchronic applicability.  
 
<Please insert Figure 3 about here> 
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6 Conclusion 
 
In this article we have revisited the notion of deontic modality from the perspective of an 
under-studied category in the modal domain, viz. adjectives. Whereas traditional 
accounts based on modal auxiliaries have defined deontic modality in terms of obligation 
and permission and have shown patterns of polysemy with dynamic and epistemic modal 
meaning, we have argued for a distinction between deontic and directive meaning in 
keeping with Nuyts et al. (2005, 2010), and we have established patterns of polysemy of 
deontic modal meaning with dynamic modal meaning and non-modal evaluative 
meaning. Thus we have redefined deontic modality as expressing someone’s (i.e. of the 
attitudinal source) assessment of the desirability for someone to carry out an SoA, 
without imposing an obligation or granting permission. Against Nuyts et al. (2005, 2010), 
however, we have shown that it is necessary to factor in the parameter of factuality status 
in the definition, in order to filter out the category of non-modal evaluation.  
In the process, we posited two parameters which distinguish between the three types 
of meaning expressed by adjectival complement constructions: (i) the parameter of the 
presence or absence of an attitudinal source groups deontic and non-modal evaluative 
meaning, and distinguishes these from dynamic meaning; (ii) the parameter of factuality 
status of the complement SoA puts together dynamic and deontic meaning, and 
distinguishes these from non-modal evaluative meaning. Importantly, these conceptual 
distinctions correlate with the lexical distinction between strong and weak adjectives, in 
that strong adjectives such as essential are restricted to expressions with an indeterminate 
factuality status (viz. virtual or potential SoAs in dynamic and deontic constructions), 
while weak adjectives such as appropriate only occur in attitudinal expressions (viz. 
deontic and non-modal evaluative constructions). These conceptual and lexical 
distinctions have been integrated into a conceptual map, for which we have adduced 
additional evidence showing its diachronic validity and synchronic applicability (see 
Figure 3 above).  
Beyond the immediate question of the nature of deontic modality, the discussions 
above also suggest that it is important not to focus on one specific part of speech when 
examining a modal category. This brings us back to the conceptual map and its formal 
types of expressions. The following figure, in which the conceptual map has been 
redrawn as a Venn diagram with four circles, shows the division of labour for the 
different parts of speech and inflectional categories in English. 
 
<Please insert Figure 4 about here> 
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As seen in Figure 4, the modal auxiliaries are most central in the diagram, though not 
exactly at the intersection of all four circles. As mentioned above, they can express 
deontic, dynamic and directive meaning, but they cannot be used to express non-modal 
evaluative meaning. The least polyvalent device is the imperative mood, which can 
perform only one type of labour, viz. the expression of directive meaning. Intermediate 
between the imperative mood and the modal auxiliaries are the adjectives studied here. 
Weak adjectives are found at the intersection of deontic and non-modal evaluative 
meaning, whereas strong adjectives are found at the intersection of deontic and dynamic 
meaning. The figure also shows that a specific class of adjectives, viz. weak ones, has a 
functionality which the auxiliaries lack. Therefore, this diagram clearly demonstrates that 
the study of modality and evaluation should not be restricted to modal auxiliaries or 
mood types.  
In addition, the data analysed here also suggest that we should not a priori exclude 
particular modes of communication or registers from analysis. The fact that modal 
expressions are omnipresent in everyday conversation might lead us to focus on spoken 
data or informal registers. This study, however, shows that constructions which are 
typical of more formal registers and the written mode, like adjectival complement 
constructions, offer interesting insights as well.  
Finally, the description of the conceptual map proposed here raises the question to 
what extent it could be regarded as a semantic map, “a geometric representation of 
meanings or, if one likes, uses, and of the relations between them” (Van der Auwera and 
Plungian, 1998:86). Semantic maps, like the map of modality proposed by Van der 
Auwera and Plungian (1998), are often used in typological studies: they depict and 
constrain how genetically and areally diverse languages divide a particular 
semantic/conceptual space among their lexical and/or grammatical items, both with 
regard to diachrony and synchrony (Van der Auwera and Plungian, 1998:86; Haspelmath, 
2003). The discussion of the main findings of this study suggests the proposed conceptual 
map shows some but not all characteristics of a semantic map. Like a semantic map, it is 
diachronically valid in that  it accommodates pathways of change for specific lexical 
items and constructions. In addition, it also applies in synchrony, in that the linguistic 
items meet the adjacency requirement: in the map, the different meanings or uses of the 
adjectives (and modal auxiliaries) are adjacent (cf. Van der Auwera and Plungian, 
1998:112). However, the conceptual map is not a genuine semantic map, in that it is not 
supposed to have cross-linguistic relevance. It has been developed on the basis of English 
data, and arguments have been proposed for its language-specific validity, but it has not 
been tested cross-linguistically. In this sense, the organization of the map opens up new 
perspectives for further research: it may be interesting to take the conceptual map into 
typology and investigate whether it also applies cross-linguistically.  
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